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Abstract 
 
The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily 
represent those of the Armenian International Policy Research Group. Working Papers describe 
research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate. 
 
This paper aims to develop a detailed analysis of quasi-fiscal deficits and subsidies, and 
their impact on Armenia’s fiscal performance in the second part of the 90-s. Based on the flow-
of-funds approach, we estimate the magnitude of the quasi-fiscal deficits and the incidence of 
quasi-fiscal subsidies in Armenia, as well as identify main recipients and donors of quasi-fiscal 
financing. The main finding of the paper is that, while quasi-fiscal deficits in Armenia remain 
considerable, their recent decline has been the main source of fiscal adjustment in Armenia to 
date.  The paper also shows that the population remains a major ultimate recipient of quasi-fiscal 
subsidies.  Thus, the main distortive impact of quasi-fiscal subsidies is on social policy, not on 
enterprise restructuring and private sector performance.  
 
 
 
* The authors are grateful to Azamat Abdymomunov, Ani Balabanyan, Artsvi Khachatryan, 
Gayane Minasyan, Carolina Revenco, Gevorg Sargsyan, Brian Steven Smith, and Eka 
Vashakmadze for comments and help with data. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper aims to develop a detailed analysis of quasi-fiscal deficits and 
subsidies, and their impact on Armenia’s fiscal performance in the second part of the 90-
s. Based on the flow-of-funds approach, we estimate the magnitude of the quasi-fiscal 
deficits and the incidence of quasi-fiscal subsidies in Armenia, as well as identify main 
recipients and donors of quasi-fiscal financing. The main finding of the paper is that, 
while quasi-fiscal deficits in Armenia remain considerable, their recent decline has been 
the main source of fiscal adjustment in Armenia to date.  The paper also shows that the 
population remains a major ultimate recipient of quasi-fiscal subsidies.  Thus, the main 
distortive impact of quasi-fiscal subsidies is on social policy, not on enterprise 
restructuring and private sector performance.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. The first section introduces an analytical 
framework for our analysis of quasi-fiscal deficits. This is followed by a discussion of 
specific features of quasi-fiscal financing in transition economies. The third section 
provides estimates of the Armenia’s actuarial and hidden deficits in the second part of the 
90-s and shows that, in comparison to some of other CIS countries, its hidden deficits 
were modest. Section IV presents a comprehensive picture of subsidization in Armenia, 
including hidden and quasi-fiscal subsidies that were a primary cause of the hidden 
deficit. The final section brings more detailed analysis of quasi-fiscal subsidies in 
Armenia by showing their ultimate sources and main beneficiaries. 
 
Section I. Traditional and Alternative Approaches to the Evaluation of Fiscal 
Adjustment 
 
The traditional approach to assessment and analysis of fiscal adjustment is based 
on the concept of government deficit, which is usually defined as an excess of 
expenditure over income (IMF, 1995). The expenditure/income approach has three well-
known limitations:  
 
(1) it covers only the items that are included in the government budget or balance 
sheet and therefore is heavily dependent upon the comprehensiveness of 
existing budget coverage;  
 
(2) it is focused on cash-based transactions and usually misses most non-cash 
Government operations;  
 
(3) it has a limited time horizon, since it is highly unusual to consider budget 
deficit estimates for periods that are longer than one year. 
 
Thus, in an environment in which fiscal accounts remain underdeveloped, 
conventional measures of the fiscal deficit could generate a distorted picture of the 
Government finances. Therefore, they are an unreliable tool for monitoring and 
evaluating basic fiscal developments. Specifically, they may not distinguish well enough 
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between a genuine fiscal adjustment and one that brings short term improvements but 
undermines longer term fiscal sustainability. 
 
As shown by Easterly (1998), when an outside agent forces the government to 
reduce conventional indicators for its deficits and debts, it may trigger a sub-optimal 
policy response in which the government substitutes true adjustment with excessive 
reductions in assets and/or increases in implicit liabilities, e.g. by privatizing public 
property, disinvesting, accumulating hidden debts, under-financing critical maintenance 
spending, extracting advance payments of taxes, borrowing from pension funds and other 
quasi-public entities, etc. 
  
Easterly argues that a government’s net worth (i.e. net present value of its assets 
and liabilities) is a more relevant concept for evaluation of government inter-temporal 
behavior. Rational governments should be much more concerned with longer-term 
optimization of their net worth than with annual improvements in the deficit indicators. 
More accurately, within a rational fiscal strategy, improvements in current balances have 
to be complemented by growth in net worth. If the net worth remains unchanged, then the 
true size of the government deficit does not decline. Simple shifts in allocations among 
assets and liabilities (both explicit and implicit), although they may improve conventional 
deficit indicators, produce an illusory fiscal adjustment.  
 
Unlike the conventional indicators of fiscal deficit, which represent a flow 
concept, an alternative - actuarial deficit - is defined through stock variables as the 
change in the total stock of government liabilities, i.e. the entire stock of public debt and 
the money base (Karas and Mishra, 2001). Thus, it is defined as: 
 
     Dta = (Bt – Bt-1) + (Mt – Mt-1), 
 
where Dta is the actuarial budget deficit in period t; Bt is the stock of the public debt; and 
Mt is the base money. The difference between the actuarial and the conventional deficits 
is called the hidden deficit.  
 
Karas and Mishra computed conventional, actuarial, and hidden deficits for 32 
countries and concluded that there is a close link between the level of both hidden and 
actuarial deficits and core macroeconomic outcomes, specifically incidence of currency 
crises.1  They argue that a currency crisis may be triggered by an increase in the hidden 
deficit through accumulation of government contingent liabilities, when markets perceive 
that such accumulation is likely to lead to an unsustainable expansion in conventional 
deficits.  
 
Hidden government deficits emerge as a result of various public sector operations 
that are not reflected (partially or entirely) in the regular government budget. In this paper 
we look only at quasi-fiscal activities (QFA) that relate to subsidization, i.e. those that 
could be described as a net transfer of public resources to the private sector (enterprises 
                                                 
1 According to their calculations, the correlation between number of currency crises and actuarial deficit is 
0.55, while with conventional deficit it is only 0.15. 
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and households) through non-budget channels. This is the most common type of QFAs. 
At the same time, this paper does not consider other types of quasi-fiscal activities, for 
instance, quasi-fiscal taxation.2  Also, we do not look here into the traditional for CIS 
quasi-fiscal instrument of sectoral extrabudgetary funds (EBFs). While EBFs were a 
major source of quasi-fiscal subsidization in the early 90-s (Delyagin and Freinkman, 
1993), their incidence has declined considerably. In most cases, including Armenia, EBF 
spending now remains within the government sector as an additional (and non-
transparent) source of financing core government services such as tax administration, but 
not of subsidies. 
 
Governments in most countries are to some extent engaged in economic activities 
that go beyond the traditional definition of public sector services and of conventional 
fiscal policy instruments. In particular, they try to protect, support and subsidize domestic 
industries to make them more competitive and financially viable, and often they do it 
through implicit subsidization, such as various tax benefit schemes. However, 
governments in developed countries tend to generate and disclose explicit cost estimates 
of such implicit subsidies, and, more importantly, these policies usually bring only 
limited accumulation of contingent liabilities. Developing and transition economies are 
quite different: the incidence of QFAs is higher, their fiscal implications often remain 
non-quantified, and building contingent liabilities to finance QFAs is rather common. 
Karas and Mishra (2001) estimate that the developed countries in their sample had annual 
hidden deficits that range from –0.7% of GDP to 1.6%, while in 16 out of 25 developing 
countries the average hidden deficit (or surplus) exceeded 1.5% of GDP per year.  
 
Common examples of quasi-fiscal subsidies include multiple exchange rate 
regimes, direct lending at below-market rates by the central bank and commercial banks, 
provision of goods and services by public enterprises at prices that are set below the 
market (or cost recovery) levels, etc.  The primary negative effects of such QFAs relate to 
resource misallocation and non-transparency. They are usually “bad subsidies” that serve 
special interest groups and are not subject to parliamentary scrutiny. As such they tend to 
undermine both the effectiveness and the integrity of the fiscal policy and budget process. 
QFAs regularly lead to large-scale bailout operations to support companies and banks 
that earlier have been a source of hidden deficit financing. This brings serious 
macroeconomic consequences as well as a moral hazard, since bailouts “legitimize” soft 
budget constraints for recipients of quasi-fiscal subsidies.3  
 
                                                 
2 Quasi-fiscal taxation has been almost entirely phased-out in most CIS countries by the late 90-s, while it 
was quite significant early in transition, especially during the high inflation period. For instance, Easterly 
and Viera da Cunha (1993) estimate that in 1992 the Russian private sector paid about 30% of GDP in the 
inflation tax. Other major quasi-fiscal taxes on enterprises included taxation on exporters through 
mandatory sales of export proceeds at non-market exchange rates, and forced direct financing by 
enterprises of core social services. 
3 Polackova-Brixi, Ghazem and Islam (2001) describe how QFAs in the Czech Republic became a source 
of conventional fiscal problems. This happened due to excessive expansion of explicit and implicit 
government guarantees for commercial credits as well as because of high incidence of off-budget spending 
by de facto budget institutions. The explicit costs of government guarantees reached 0.4% of GDP in 1998. 
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Thus, it is important to distinguish between two sides of quasi-fiscal activities: a) 
mechanisms of non-transparent subsidization of the private sector, including households, 
i.e. how are resources transferred?, and b) financing of these subsidies, who is paying for 
this resource transfer and how?  
 
Moreover, the problem of quasi-fiscal deficits and subsidies has two inter-related 
and equally important dimensions that relate respectively to macroeconomic and 
enterprise sector performance.  Accumulated experience with transition since 1990 
suggests that dramatic reduction in total subsidies (budgeted and non-budgeted) is a 
critical prerequisite for both macroeconomic stabilization and enterprise restructuring, 
and at the same time it has a major impact on the credibility of the entire reform process 
(Pinto et al., 2000a, 2000b).  
 
Section II. Quasi-Fiscal Activities in the FSU Countries 
 
Compared to most developing countries, former socialist economies in Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE), and especially those in the FSU, started their market reforms 
with a much higher burden of QFAs. This derived from two factors: 1) SOEs in these 
countries have been a major source of financing and provision of either free or highly 
subsidized public services,4 and 2) consumers in these economies have been accustomed 
to high (relative to their post-socialist income levels) consumption of energy and utility 
services, which were delivered at low prices and in the absence of reliable mechanisms to 
enforce payments for received services5. As a result, most QFAs in transition economies 
are associated with the activities of SOEs in the energy sector, while elsewhere in the 
developing world QFAs were traditionally generated by financial sector entities (IMF, 
1995, pp.17-18). 
 
These peculiarities of CEE economies proved to be a major stumbling block for 
the reform process in transition in general, and especially in the CIS economies, because 
these were the most isolated from the impact of world energy prices. Phasing out QFAs 
has been rather slow in most CIS countries, and its progress has broadly followed the 
path (with all its ups and downs) of macroeconomic stabilization in the region. The 
transfer of social services from enterprises to municipalities has been difficult because of 
the traditional weakness of municipal governments and slow fiscal decentralization. As a 
result, governments were forced to tolerate QFAs and did not impose hard budget 
constraints on SOEs that continue to finance energy subsidies and social services. 
 
The introduction of fiscal discipline in the energy sector has been among the most 
challenging reforms in transition. Since very early in transition, enterprises and 
households in the region were not able to afford the traditional level of energy 
consumption at world prices, while governments were initially reluctant and later slow to 
                                                 
4 Freinkman and Starodubrovskaya (1996) provide a detailed account of public services provided by 
Russian SOEs in the first part of the 90-s and estimate that the value of these services amounted to 3-4% of 
GDP or about 20% of their gross wage bill. 
5 For instance, in Russia and several other countries, national Civil Codes contain provisions that seriously 
erode the right of the supplier to disconnect customers for non-payment. 
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raise domestic energy prices and to introduce an aggressive policy of cutting off non-
paying energy customers. This happened partly due to real political concerns about the 
social implications of dramatically higher energy prices and anticipated mass 
bankruptcies, and partly due to well-organized pressure from domestic interest groups. 
As a result, energy-related subsidies became the main channel of subsidization in CIS 
economies, which in turn made them a primary source of soft budget constraint for the 
enterprise sector, as well as a significant additional source of fiscal and macroeconomic 
risks. 
 
While a high incidence of energy-related subsidies has become a universal 
phenomenon in the CIS since the early 90-s, their fiscal and macroeconomic 
consequences in a specific country were different depending upon access to energy 
resources. Energy-exporting countries (Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan) had a possibility 
for delaying energy sector reforms and financing energy subsidies through implicit 
taxation of their energy producers. Energy-dependent countries, especially those that do 
not have access to major transit pipelines (e.g. Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic), 
were quickly forced to import energy at prices close to those of world markets, and thus 
were required to make difficult choices about the sources of financing of the remaining 
subsidies. Access to transit oil and gas pipelines (in Ukraine and Moldova) helped to 
delay shocks by providing access to significant amounts of de facto free energy. 
However, stealing gas from the Russian pipelines proved to be an unsustainable strategy 
and made the ultimate adjustment in these countries even more painful.6 
 
The case of Russia provides a good illustration of the typical adjustment pattern in 
an energy-abundant CIS economy. Till the 1998crisis, Russian federal and sub-national 
governments were excessively protective of “socially important” enterprises from 
bankruptcy and downsizing, and uninterrupted access to energy was a major channel of 
subsidization. In 1995–97 annual hidden and untargeted subsidies, provided through 
systematic nonpayment of both taxes and energy supply, amounted to 7–10 percent of 
GDP (Pinto at al., 2000b). Simultaneously, as liberalization and stabilization in Russia 
progressed, implicit taxes on energy exporters, which earlier helped to finance these 
subsidies, disappeared. Moreover, by 1997, the main energy monopolies became capable 
of transferring practically the entire cost of hidden subsidies to the consolidated 
government budget. This was achieved by accumulating tax arrears7 and winning 
considerable tax benefits, especially with respect to export sales. The Russian 
Government was forced to expand its external and domestic borrowing to cover the 
widening fiscal gap, which eventually became a core trigger for the 1998 crisis. In turn, 
imposition of much stronger budget constraint on both energy consumers and energy 
producers became a major component of Russian fiscal recovery after 1998 (Asad and 
Sundberg, 2002). 
 
                                                 
6 It is estimated that the value of transit gas stolen in Ukraine by May 2000 reached $1 billion or 3% of 
Ukraine’s 2000 GDP (Petri at al., 2002, p. 13)  
7 The outstanding stock of unpaid taxes by the energy sector exceeded 3.5% of GDP at the end of 1997, 
despite several major offset exercises undertaken by the Government in the mid 90-s.   
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In Azerbaijan, under-pricing of energy and non-payment to energy suppliers have 
been the main types of quasi-fiscal subsidies (Petri at al., 2002). The total amount of 
quasi-fiscal subsidies provided to domestic end-consumers through sales that were priced 
below the opportunity costs amounted to 7% of GDP in 1999. The main non-payers in the 
economy have been households, which on average pay only 10% of their energy bills. 
 
In energy dependent countries in the CIS, the adjustment path was different. 
Hikes in energy prices (Table 1) led to a painful adjustment in energy consumption, 
which, however, was much smaller than the decline in incomes of both local consumers 
and governments8. (Also see new WB Heating Paper.) As a result, the remaining energy 
subsidies, still considerable, have been financed primarily by accumulating external 
arrears to energy suppliers and by under-financing of sectoral maintenance. Because the 
main energy companies in the energy-importing countries have remained state-owned, 
the arrears were eventually transformed into government-to-government debts. Russia 
and Turkmenistan – the primary energy exporters in the CIS – became major creditors to 
other FSU countries.  
 
Table 1.  Armenia: Pre-Transition Price Distortions and Price Adjustment in the Early in 
Transition 
 
 
Price ratios between world and pre-
transition (1988) domestic prices, by 
sector 
Relative price growth 
by sector in 1988-94, 
actual 
Total Industry, weighted average 1.00 1.00 
o/w:  Manufacturing 0.95 n.a. 
Energy 2.48 3.52 
Non-ferrous metallurgy 2.10 3.56 
Chemical and petrochemical 1.24 4.11 
Machinery  and metal processing           1.56 0.76 
Forestry  and wood  processing  n.a. 2.46 
Construction materials industry n.a. 2.33 
Light  industry  0.54 0.58 
Food industry 0.52 1.00 
Other industries 1.30 n.a. 
Source: Estimates by Vahram Avanessian and the National Statistical Service.  
 
In Ukraine, for instance, quasi-fiscal subsidies originating in the gas sector 
amounted to 5.6% of GDP in 2000 and were mostly financed through accumulation of 
arrears to the Russian gas suppliers. Arrears by energy consumers amounted to about 
three fourths of the total subsidies. Households received about a half of this amount, 
including through massive non-payments for received gas and electricity (Petri at. al., 
2002).  
 
Many CIS economies’ high dependence of on energy imports and the inability to 
reduce it in the short term proved to be a major feature in the local political economy of 
                                                 
8 In Armenia, for instance, electricity consumption declined 2.9 times between 1991 and 1995, while non-
agricultural GDP declined by 4 times.  
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reforms, affecting their overall reform path. These states became quite vulnerable to real 
and potential energy pressures, associated with possible cuts of energy supplies for non-
payments.  Moreover, powerful interest groups have emerged that became major 
beneficiaries of remaining energy subsidies and natural supporters of the status quo.  
 
Despite programs of massive international assistance, launched in most of these 
states between 1991 and 1999, external debts of the low-income CIS countries increased 
from close to zero to unsustainable levels (World Bank, 2001a)9. Quasi-fiscal (hidden) 
government deficits, especially those that were related to the energy sector, were the 
single major factor responsible for such unsustainable debt dynamics. And the debts that 
have their roots in the energy sector have, as a rule, become the most expensive part of 
the debt burden. Therefore, energy sector reform has migrated to the center of the overall 
reform agenda in the CIS because of its critical linkages with fiscal sustainability, 
enterprise restructuring, and reforms in social protection. 
 
 
Section III. Armenia:  Public Sector Balance and Hidden Deficit 
 
Compared to other low-income and energy-dependent CIS economies, Armenia 
has shown somewhat stronger macroeconomic performance in the second part of 90-s.10 
This has been most noticeable with respect to exchange rate and public debt 
developments. Armenia was the only country in the group that managed to avoid a 
destructive currency devaluation following the 1998 Russia crisis (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1.  Real Exchange Developments in Selected CIS Countries (relative to the US$), 
1994=100 
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Source: IMF. 
 
Its external debt remained manageable through the entire period and, moreover, 
Armenia’s debt profile did improve considerably in 2000-02 (Table 2). In addition, its 
                                                 
9 Several donors’ projects in that period were explicitly designed to facilitate restructuring and/or 
repayment of energy-related external debts. 
10 Horvath, Thacker, and Ha (1998) examine the early (1994-96) stabilization efforts by the Armenian 
Government. World Bank (2002) describes trends in Armenia’s fiscal performance in 1997-2001. 
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public finance system has been less affected by such common regional problems as 
barter, cash substitutes, pension and other government arrears, etc. 
 
Table 2.  Net Present Value of External Debt, in percent, 2000 
 
 Ratio to Exports of Goods & 
Services (*) 
Ratio to Central Government 
Revenue 
Armenia, 2002 102 167 
Armenia, 2000 135 177 
Georgia 128 356 
Kyrgyz Republic 198 576 
Moldova 139 380 
Tajikistan 137 450 
Source: World Bank (2001a), IMF. 
Note: (*) - three-year moving average for exports 
 
This comes somewhat as a surprise because Armenia’s stronger macroeconomic 
outcomes could not be explained or linked to any significant differences in its budget 
performance. Conventional estimates for Armenia’s budget deficit were in fact higher 
than those for many of its comparators during the period (e.g. Georgia, Tajikistan, 
Ukraine), including the years before the Russia crisis (Table 3). 
 
Table 3.  CIS: General Governments’ Budget Deficits, Cash, Percent of GDP 
 
              Average 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 1996-98 1999-01 
Low Deficit Countries        
Turkmenistan  0.3 0 -2.7 0 -0.4 0.9 -0.8 0.2 
Belarus  0 -0.3 -0.3 -2.1 -0.1 -1.9 -0.2 -1.4 
Azerbaijan  -2.8 -1.6 -3.9 -4.7 -0.6 0.9 -2.8 -1.5 
Estonia  -1.5 2.2 -0.3 -4.6 -0.7 0.4 0.1 -1.6 
Latvia  -1.4 1.4 -0.8 -3.9 -3.3 -1.9 -0.3 -3.0 
Middle Deficit Countries        
Tajikistan  -5.8 -3.3 -3.8 -3.1 -0.6 -0.1 -4.3 -1.3 
Ukraine  -3.2 -5.6 -2.8 -2.4 -1.3 -1.6 -3.9 -1.8 
Uzbekistan  -7.3 -2.4 -3.3 -2.6 -2.2 -2.2 -4.3 -2.3 
Lithuania  -4.5 -1.8 -5.9 -8.5 -2.8 -1.9 -4.1 -4.4 
High Deficit Countries        
Russia  -8.9 -8 -7.9 -3.1 3.1 2.6 -8.3 0.9 
Kazakhstan  -5.4 -7.1 -7.6 -5 -0.8 3.2 -6.7 -0.9 
Moldova  -7 -9.3 -5.7 -3.4 -2.6 -0.5 -7.3 -2.2 
Georgia  -7.1 -6.1 -4.9 -5 -2.6 -1.6 -6.0 -3.1 
Armenia  -8.3 -4.7 -3.7 -5.2 -4.8 -4.2 -6.5 -4.7 
Kyrgyz Republic  -9.5 -9.2 -9.5 -11.9 -9.2 -5.0 -9.4 -8.7 
Source: IMF, for Armenia – the most recent Government data. 
 
As it is argued in the rest of the paper, the primary explanation for this would-be 
inconsistency relates to the fact that in Armenia hidden off-budget deficits were much 
lower than in other low-income economies in the CIS. Despite its persistent problems in 
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the energy and utility sectors, Armenia has been more successful than the average 
economy in the group in reducing overall quasi-fiscal subsidies and putting a relatively 
large part of the rest into the regular budget. This proved to be a critical contribution to 
improvements in macroeconomic trends. The main finding of this paper is that a main 
source of fiscal adjustment in Armenia to date was indeed the reduced quasi-fiscal 
deficits. 
 
Table 4 presents estimates for the conventional, hidden, and actuarial deficit in 
Armenia in 1995-2001. They are estimated using the definitions provided above in 
Section I.  
 
Table 4.  Armenia: Actuarial, Conventional, and Hidden Deficit, 1995-2001, mn $US 
and Percent of GDP 
 Annual flows: 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
External Debt 182.0 165.0 106.0 95.0 73.0 19.0 37.0 
as % of GDP 14.16% 10.33% 6.53% 5.00% 3.96% 0.99% 1.74% 
Domestic Debt 0.5 24.2 22.5 -7.1 3.2 11.9 2.5 
as % of GDP 0.04% 1.51% 1.39% -0.38% 0.17% 0.62% 0.12% 
Energy Sector Arrears 30.7 75.4 42.1 88.9 (16.8) (13.3) 23.5 
as % of GDP 2.39% 4.72% 2.59% 4.68% -0.91% -0.69% 1.11% 
Reserve Money 36 22 7 1 (0) 28 12 
as % of GDP 2.83% 1.36% 0.45% 0.05% -0.02% 1.48% 0.56% 
Budget Arrears 0.0 0.0 2.8 10.2 38.0 38.5 -2.9 
as % of GDP 0.00% 0.00% 0.17% 0.54% 2.06% 2.01% -0.14% 
  Total increase in liabilities 249.6 286.4 180.7 188.0 97.1 84.4 72.1 
as % of GDP 19.42% 17.93% 11.13% 9.90% 5.26% 4.40% 3.39% 
Privaitization proceeds 0.0 0.0 0.1 82.9 53.0 66.3 36.3 
as % of GDP 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 4.36% 2.87% 3.46% 1.70% 
Gross Reserves of CBA (29.5) (58.9) (74.3) (98.0) 9.9 0.6 (3.4) 
as % of GDP -2.29% -3.68% -4.58% -5.16% 0.54% 0.03% -0.16% 
  Total Loss of Assets (29.5) (58.9) (74.2) (15.1) 62.9 66.9 32.9 
  % of GDP -2.29% -3.68% -4.57% -0.79% 3.41% 3.49% 1.55% 
PSB (Actuarial Deficit) 220.2 227.5 106.6 173.0 156.0 151.3 105.0 
Actuarial Deficit (as % of GDP) 17.12% 14.25% 6.57% 9.11% 8.67% 7.89% 4.93% 
        as percent of GDP        
Budget Deficit (accrual) 8.9% 8.3% 4.9% 4.2% 7.3% 6.7% 3.8% 
Hidden Deficit 8.22% 5.95% 1.67% 4.91% 1.37% 1.19% 1.13% 
         
Memorandum Items        
Conventional Budget Deficit, cash 8.9% 8.3% 4.7% 3.7% 5.2% 4.8% 4.2% 
GDP ($ million) 1,286 1,597 1,623 1,899 1,845 1,917 2,129 
Exchange rate, end of period 402 435 495 522 524 552 562 
Note. A. For the energy sector: debt estimates include regular commercial debts (e.g. to banks) and arrears on inputs, 
wages and other private sector creditors, but exclude debts to the Government. Also include debt write-offs. 
B. For the Government: debt estimates exclude publicly guaranteed debts. 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on the data from the Armenian MOFE, Pension Fund, Ministry of Energy, Central 
Bank, and the IMF. 
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Table 4 confirms some improvements in the fiscal performance of the Armenian 
Government starting in 1997.  The average consolidated budget deficit (accrual) for 
1997-2001 declined to an average of about 5.5% of GDP, from over 8% in the previous 
two years.  This was a serious achievement, but clearly insufficient because it remained 
far above its sustainable medium-term level, which is estimated by the World Bank 
(2002) to be about 3.5% of GDP.1112  However, it is worth noting that, as was shown in 
Table 3, many of Armenia’s neighbors managed to attain much larger improvements in 
their budget deficits in the mid 90-s, but this still did not give them sufficient fiscal 
strength to get through the Russia crisis of 1998 without being severely hit.  Thus, 
conventional fiscal indicators do not help to explain significant differences in 
macroeconomic performance between Armenia and other low-income CIS economies.  
 
The analysis of actuarial deficit in Table 4 is based on the consolidation of annual 
changes in five components of public liabilities (external and domestic debts, budget 
arrears, money supply, and payables (including arrears) of public energy companies) and 
two types of public assets (value of state holdings in the real sector and foreign exchange 
reserves of the Central Bank).  The dynamics of debts accumulated by Armenia’s energy 
sector represent most of the public sector’s net liabilities accumulated outside of the 
Government budget.13  Annual changes in the value of public holdings were measured by 
amounts of privatization proceeds spent by the Government in the same year14.  
 
Compared to the conventional deficit indicators, the changes in actuarial deficit 
point much more clearly to a major adjustment undertaken by the Government in 1997, 
when the hidden deficit almost disappeared15.  While the following year was less 
successful, the average level of actuarial deficit in 1999-2001 was less than 7.5% of 
GDP, compared to more than 15% in 1995-96. Even more importantly, hidden deficits 
declined drastically after 1999 and stayed pretty small in 1999-01 (Figure 2). Figure 3 
describes the structure of actuarial deficit, showing that in 1995-97 it was dominated by 
external borrowing, while later the actuarial deficit had a more diversified structure.   
 
Major reforms in the power sector, undertaken in 1997, made a critical 
contribution to improvements in the public sector balance in that year. The average 
electricity tariff was increased from 1.4c to 4.2c, collections (especially in cash) 
improved, while barter payments were mostly phased out. An additional contribution to 
                                                 
11 It is believed that Armenia could afford a relatively high deficit levels for the next several years because 
its good access to highly concessional financing, including IDA, bilateral donors, and Diaspora’s sources, 
in a combination with high growth rates keeps its debt profile sustainable. 
12 The fiscal outcome for 2001 looks encouraging but it remains to be seen how sustainable it is.   
13 This is primarily because main outstanding debts of non-energy SOEs in Armenia are those to their 
energy suppliers and to the government, i.e. they are the debts that are within the public sector and should 
be excluded in this exercise to avoid double counting. 
14 The total for used privatization proceeds includes gas-for-equity swap in the energy sector, which has not 
been reflected in the budget.  
15 The factors that contributed to the improved macro and fiscal outcome in 1997 included: improved 
revenue performance, strengthened performance of the power sector, and shutting down the Nairit company 
for about 6 months. 
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the sector’s financial recovery was made through the operation of the nuclear power 
plant, which was re-started in late 1995 (World Bank, 1999b, pp.75-84).  
 
Figure 2.  Armenia. Hidden Deficit as Percent of GDP, 1995-2001 
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Figure 3.  Armenia. Composition of Actuarial Deficit, Percent of GDP 
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Figure 4.  Armenia. Accrual and Actuarial Deficits, Percent of GDP 
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The comparison between actuarial and conventional (accrual) deficit estimates 
(Figure 4) show than the actuarial deficit has been declining much faster, specially since 
1999, that the traditional budget deficit, i.e. a larger part of the adjustment took place 
outside of the conventional fiscal system. This confirms that the real fiscal adjustment in 
Armenia was more significant than one may assess based on changes in traditional 
budget deficit data. 
 
At the same time, these two deficit indicators in Armenia have been comfortably 
close for the entire period (except for 1998).  This means that the combined deficit of 
public sector operations unaccounted in the budget (including money supply) was not 
much larger than the ongoing asset accumulation by the public sector, i.e. accumulation 
of foreign reserves by the CBA.  
 
The conventional fiscal analysis underestimates this improvement in part because 
it ignores the quite impressive build-up of foreign exchange reserves by the Armenian 
authorities (Figure 5), which increased from $109.5 million (8.5% of GDP) in 1995 to 
$340.6 million in late 1998 (17.9% of GDP). Taking into account forex reserve 
accumulation16 is actually rather important for adequate assessment of changes in the net 
worth of the Government as well as for basic Government’s fiscal performance during 
the period.  
                                                 
16 In Armenia borrowing from the IMF to build CBA reserves was one of the significant factors that 
contributed to high growth rates of the total external debt.  
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Figure 5.  Gross International Reserves, as Percent of GDP, Year End 
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Source: CBA.   
 
The decline in the hidden deficit confirms that at least in a macroeconomic sense 
budget adjustment in Armenia in the 90s was quite genuine, i.e., it was not accompanied 
by excessive growth of hidden off-budget liabilities. In other words, unaccounted leakage 
from the system was quite modest.  
 
 
Figure 6.  Moldova, Fiscal Adjustment, 1995-2000, Percent of GDP 
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Such a trend in fiscal adjustment in Armenia could be compared with broader 
regional patterns.  Figure 6 presents the case of Moldova, which is selected as a rather 
typical CIS economy that showed an unsustainable fiscal performance in most of the 90-
s.  As the diagram suggests, for each year between 1995 and 1998, the estimated actuarial 
deficit of the public sector for Moldova exceeded its accrual Government deficit by 1.5 -2 
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times.  The average reported budget deficit for this period was 9% of GDP, while the 
actuarial deficit was over 16%.  This means that a significant part of the public deficit 
remained off budget, with public liabilities accumulated at the balance sheets of energy 
and utility companies, while the growth in overall public debt exceeded the budget 
deficit’s financing requirements.  Such a financial performance was clearly unsustainable.  
This led to a major macroeconomic crisis in 1998 (triggered by the Russia crisis) and was 
followed by a radical fiscal adjustment in 1999-2000, supported by external debt relief, 
debt-for-equity swap with Russia, and erosion of domestic debts due to inflation and 
devaluation. 
 
Overall, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the fiscal adjustment in 
Armenia in 1997-01 was driven by the reduction in quasi-fiscal (hidden) deficits and 
phasing out of quasi-fiscal subsidies. Hidden deficits in Armenia were smaller in 1997-98 
than in other low income CIS countries, and the Government of Armenia has further 
advanced the consolidation of its fiscal system in 1999-2001 through reduction in the 
overall public sector deficit, including both budgeted and quasi-fiscal portions.  However, 
these positive processes still have to be further advanced to ensure longer-term fiscal 
sustainability.  
 
 
Section IV. Hidden Budget Subsidies, Quasi-fiscal Subsidies and Contingent 
Liabilities in Armenia 
IV.1 Definitions 
 
In this section we try to distinguish between three inter-related phenomena:  
 
a) Hidden budget subsidies represent an ultimate cash transfer from the 
government to the enterprise and household sectors that is either not identified as a 
subsidy in the Government’s accounts or not reflected in these accounts at all. The hidden 
subsidies include e.g. direct budget credits, tax exemptions and tax arrears, enterprise 
transfers from state extra-budgetary funds, enterprises’ gains from import and export 
quotas, re-capitalization of troubled SOEs, etc. In some particular cases hidden subsidies 
are reflected (but more frequently they are not) in the official budgetary documents 
(while they are not called “subsidies”), and often they are used to clear (i.e. finance) debts 
that emerge as a result of either a) quasi-fiscal subsidies provided earlier or b) 
accumulation of contingent liabilities (CLs). 
 
b) Quasi-fiscal activities/subsidies represent provision of implicit subsidies by 
public sector entities that operate outside of the regular Government budget such as a 
Central Bank, state-owned commercial banks, state enterprises in energy and public 
utilities, etc. In the case of public utilities and other “important” state-owned enterprises, 
they usually finance such subsidies through a heavy debt accumulation. There is an 
implicit assumption by creditors and suppliers that the government will step up and bail-
out these companies if necessary to prevent their insolvency. 
 
c) Contingent liabilities represent liabilities that potentially may (or may not) 
become explicit claims on the government budget in the future periods. The real value of 
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CLs could be usually known only ex post, while the real time estimates for CL levels are 
often derived from stochastic models. Traditional examples of CLs include government 
guarantees on commercial credits, operations of public social and medical insurance 
funds, risks/costs associated with the collapse of banking system,17 as well as costs of 
possible currency crises. 
 
Incidence of QFAs and CLs in Armenia 
 
As mentioned above, compared to other low-income and energy-dependent CIS 
economies, Armenia has shown somewhat stronger macroeconomic and fiscal discipline, 
which is, among other things, associated with utilization of fewer quasi-fiscal 
instruments. In this regard, the following features of Armenia’s fiscal system should be 
mentioned:  
 
• Armenia introduced quite a liberal trade regime (rated 1 by the IMF) very early in 
transition; it automatically eliminated many possibilities for quasi-fiscal 
subsidization, e.g. through import quotas and multiple exchange rates.  
 
• The Armenian tax legislation does not leave room for individual tax exemptions18 
to be granted by special Government decisions to specific, usually the largest 
enterprises. 
 
• Since 1996 the Central Bank of Armenia has become quite conservative in its 
monetary policy and increasingly independent from Government pressures, which 
greatly reduced possibilities for using direct CBA credits and other interventions 
as a quasi-fiscal instrument. 
 
• The Government has created a rather restrictive environment that in practice has 
prevented Armenian local governments and the Pension Fund from borrowing on 
commercial terms. 
 
• Armenian extra-budgetary funds, while still significant19, have been spent almost 
entirely on additional financing of government administration, but not financing 
of investment programs or rehabilitation of the enterprise sector. 
 
• The Government has mostly escaped the trap of non-cash substitutes; offset 
operations between budget (arrears) and largest taxpayers (tax debts) were rather 
limited. It is estimated that in 1997-98 only 10% of sales of the largest enterprises 
were paid in barter (World Bank, 2001c). 
                                                 
17 As in other developing economies, public costs of banking crises in transition are quite high. For 
instance, costs of bank restructuring in Latvia were estimated as 22% of GDP and in Slovakia as 12% of 
GDP (Asad and Sundberg, 2002). 
18 In Kyrgyzstan, for instance, various tax exemptions amounted to 5-7% of GDP a year (Asad and 
Sundberg, 2002). 
19 In 2000 the total volume of EBFs administered by individual ministries and government agencies in 
Armenia amounted to 0.7% of GDP (World Bank, 2002). 
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• The Armenian social insurance system (the Pension Fund) has been considered 
quite fiscally sustainable, mostly due to the very low level of old age pensions 
paid to most retirees (PADCO, 2001).  
 
• The banking system was fully privatized and at the same time remained quite 
small, with limited possible spillover from a potential banking crisis to the rest of 
the economy. 
 
• The possibility of a currency crisis remained low due to an aggressive policy of 
accumulation of foreign reserves (see Figure 5 above), which have been rather 
high since 1998 in relation to both imports and dram M2. 
 
This does not mean that QFAs in Armenia were of no importance. But both 
channels and sources of quasi-fiscal financing were heavily concentrated, which makes it 
somewhat easier to quantify both their intensity as well as the allocation of associated 
benefits among their recipients. 
 
IV.2. Hidden Subsidies 
 
Soft low-interest budget credits have been the main channel of hidden 
Government support to struggling SOEs in Armenia. In most cases, these credits were not 
repaid but written-off by the Government. Most of these credits went to state energy and 
utility companies as a de facto compensation (financing) for continuous quasi-fiscal 
subsidization of the rest of the economy by these companies. For any practical purpose, 
these credits represent traditional budget subsidies and should be re-classified in the 
Government’s books as such. In 1997-2001, the annual flow of budget credits amounted 
on average to about 0.7% of GDP (Table 5). 
 
Table 5.  Budget Subsidies and Direct Budget Credits to Large SOEs, mn Drams 
  
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Total subsidies and direct credits 4,986 6,579 26,314 11,357 11,865 
As % of GDP 0.62 0.69 2.66 0.99 1.01 
As % of total budget expenditures 2.5 2.75 9.27 3.92 4.16 
Budget subsidies 2,986 1,629 14,546 7,404 6,749 
As % of GDP 0.37 0.17 1.47 0.72 0.57 
Total budget credit to non-financial institutions 2,000 4,950 11,768 3,953 5,116 
As % of GDP 0.25 0.52 1.19 0.28 0.43 
Irrigation  1,795 2,443   
Airline and airport  508 1,825 3,531 1,845 
Drinking water companies 2,000 2,000 1,200 - - 
Energy companies   1,900  3,200 
Nairit   4,400   
Residential housing  647  422 71 
Source: World Bank (2002). 
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Tax arrears represent another significant channel of hidden subsidization. While 
the level of tax arrears in Armenia was somewhat lower than in most CIS economies, it 
still constitutes a major fiscal burden. The average annual increase of tax arrears in 1997-
2001 was close to 1% of GDP (Table 6), despite a few write-offs of such debts.20 
 
 
Table 6.  Tax Arrears, Stocks by the Year end, Million Dram 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Total tax arrears 19,986 27,181 46,474 55,566 64,503 64,612 
- as % of GDP 3.02% 3.38% 4.86% 5.63% 6.25% 5.50% 
o/w: arrears to the SIF 6,779 6,548 7,225 7,353 8,989 9,683 
- as % of GDP 1.03% 0.81% 0.76% 0.74% 0.87% 0.82% 
Change as percent of GDP 0.29% 0.89% 2.02% 0.92% 0.87% 0.01% 
Note: Excluding fines and penalties   
 
In Armenia, tax arrears are heavily concentrated. At late 2001, the 30 largest 
debtors held 47% of the total tax debt and 56% of the total debt to the Pension Fund 
(SIF). Tax liabilities of the energy sector amounted to about a third of the total tax debts. 
 
Use of privatization proceeds.  In general, the Armenian Government utilized the 
privatization proceeds through the regular budgetary process, while disbursements from 
the Special Privatization Account were made mostly for public investment purposes as 
approved by the annual budget law. However, privatization of the Armenian gas 
distribution network in 1998 was structured in such a way (gas-for-equity swap) that its 
financial results remained outside of the country’s fiscal system. In fact, the gas-for-
equity swap was the largest hidden subsidy in recent Armenian history. The gas, received 
by Armenia as a payment in the course of four years, was transferred to the power sector 
as a free resource to support electricity generation by the thermo power plants.  
 
If the swap were settled at market prices, then the total value of this subsidy 
would be about US $123.7 million, equivalent to an average annual subsidy of 1.6% of 
GDP for 1998-2001 (Table 7).  
 
Table 7.  Subsidization Through the Gas-for-equity Privatization (mln Dram) 
 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 
Volume of transaction 21,206 17,426 14,288 12,581 
- as % of GDP 2.22% 1.76% 1.38% 1.07% 
Source: Ministry of Energy.  
 
Government external borrowing to support operations of companies in the E&U sector.  
Accumulation of debts related to import of energy inputs made a significant contribution 
to the build-up of Armenia’s overall external debt in the 90-s. About a half of the non-
concessional bilateral debts (amounting to about $80 mn or 4% of GDP) originated in the 
                                                 
20 For instance, in 1997 the Government wrote-off 42 bn Dram (2.2% of GDP) in tax arrears of the power 
sector. 
 18 
energy sector. The Government accumulated external debts on behalf of the energy and 
utility sector through two primary channels:   
 
a) New credits received to finance import of energy inputs, other recurrent costs and 
capital rehabilitation, and 
 
b) Government repayments of the debts initially accumulated by the energy sector to 
external suppliers.21 
 
Table 7a.  Government External Borrowing to Support Operations of the Energy 
and Utility Sector, mn Dram 
 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Irrigation - 6,023 11,697 4,728 4,392 
Municipal Water - 1,225 1,468 2,343 2,414 
Power 2,370 8,392 3,037 1,857 4,350 
Total 2,370 15,640 16,202 8,928 11,156 
as percent of GDP 0.29% 1.64% 1.63% 0.86% 0.95% 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy 
 
Table 7a summarizes the amount of resources received by the E&U sector from 
the Government through such debt transfers, i.e. the Government’s accumulation of 
external debts of behalf of the sector. These estimates reflect both new disbursements (an 
inflow of credit funds in 1997-2001) and the costs of Government’s service of earlier 
borrowing (1992-96) that benefited the E&U sector. Note that this Government support 
to the sector has never been reflected in the budget as subsidies, but usually treated as 
either public investments or other expenditures. This is why we consider these operations 
as hidden Government subsidies. Annex 1 provides a full list of such credits. 
 
Table 8 summarizes our estimates for hidden budget subsidies to the enterprise 
(mostly E&U) sector. It suggests that in 1998-1999 the annual volume of hidden public 
support exceeded 6% of GDP. Table 9 presents our final estimates for the overall subsidy 
flow in the Armenian economy, reflecting explicit, hidden, and quasi-fiscal subsidies. In 
1998-1999 total average annual subsidies exceeded 10% of GDP, with hidden subsidies 
accounting for more than 60% of the total. At the same time, one should note some 
reduction in QF subsidies in 1999, which was a reflection of Government’s efforts to 
increase cost recovery in tariffs, improve payment discipline, and reflect energy subsidies 
somewhat more adequately in the budget.  Overall our estimates in Tables 8 and 9 reflect 
excessive subsidization of final consumers in the energy and utility sector in late 90-s, 
which generated a need for Government support to the energy sector through various 
types of explicit and implicit subsidies. Figure 7 illustrates the intensity of various 
channels of subsidization.   
                                                 
21 Initially, fuel for energy generation (natural gas and nuclear fuel) was imported to Armenia under 
commercial contracts, signed by energy companies. With time, the government took on the responsibility 
for these debts.  
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 Both tables 8 and 9 also show a considerable decline in both hidden and total 
subsidies in 2000 and 2001. Still, less than a quarter of total subsidies has been budgeted 
in 2001.  
 
Table 8.  Total Hidden Subsidies, as Percent of GDP 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Budget credits 0.25% 0.52% 1.19% 0.38% 0.43% 
Change in tax arrears 4.36% 2.08% 1.53% 0.45% -0.32% 
Privatization proceeds 0.00% 2.22% 1.76% 1.38% 1.07% 
Debt Transfer 0.29% 1.64% 1.63% 0.86% 0.95% 
Total 4.91% 6.46% 6.11% 3.08% 2.13% 
 
Table 9. Total subsidies (as percent of GDP)   
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Budgeted subsidies (a) 0.37% 0.17% 1.47% 0.72% 0.57% 
Hidden subsidies (b) 4.91% 6.46% 6.11% 3.08% 2.13% 
QF subsidies (c) 4.17% 4.50% 2.91% 2.25% 1.54% 
 Energy non-payments 3.83% 4.02% 2.20% 1.95% 1.34% 
Water non-payments 0.33% 0.47% 0.70% 0.30% 0.19% 
Total subsidies 9.44% 11.12% 10.48% 6.05% 4.24% 
   - o/w: budgeted (a) 0.62% 0.69% 2.66% 0.99% 1.01% 
             as of total 6.6% 6.2% 25.4% 16.4% 23.8% 
Source: Authors’ estimates   
Notes: (a) per Table 5; (b) per Table 8; (c) as explained in the section IV.3 
 
Figure 7.  Budgeted Subsidies, Hidden Subsidies, and Quasi-Fiscal Subsidies, Percent of GDP 
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IV. 3. Quasi-fiscal Subsidies 
 
As in many other CIS countries, QFAs in Armenia were heavily concentrated in 
the energy and utility (E&U) sector. This happened due to three main reasons, partially 
described earlier: a) the sector was dominated by large state-owned companies with weak 
corporate governance structures and heavy political influence; b) the Government was 
not prepared for radical reforms in the E&U sector because of the concerns regarding the 
possible social and political implications of such a reform; and c) technical peculiarities 
of the inherited infrastructure networks led to additional obstacles to improvements in 
sectoral performance, in particular making it difficult to cut-off non-paying customers. 
 
The Figure 8 describes the general organization of quasi-fiscal financing in 
Armenia. The central position in the diagram is occupied by the flow of quasi-fiscal 
subsidies from the energy and utility sector to the rest of the economy. Historically, as 
soon as the accumulation of these subsidies became unaffordable for the sector and could 
result in the interruptions of energy supply to the country, the Government has been 
forced to intervene by providing additional financial support to both subsidy providers in 
the E&U sector and subsidy recipients in the water, irrigation, and transportation sectors, 
as well as to the largest SOEs in manufacturing. Such Government financial support was 
granted both as conventional and as hidden subsidies. Overall, however, the Government 
was not able to provide a sufficient financial compensation to the E&U sector from its 
own resources. A large part of the ultimate financing of quasi-fiscal subsidies was 
provided by external government borrowing, arrears (domestic and external) of 
companies in the E&U sector, and by under-financing of critical maintenance and 
rehabilitation spending in the sector. 
 
The E&U sector has subsidized its customers through two main channels – low 
tariffs and non-payments.  
 
Subsidization through tariffs in Armenia has been rather modest (by regional 
standards) 22. Since early 1999 most tariffs (in power, water, and heating) have been 
sufficient (if collected) to cover the respective companies’ operational costs as well as a 
portion of capital costs. Most cross subsidies through tariffs (provided through discounted 
tariffs to privileged groups of population) were eliminated in mid 1997. At the beginning 
of 1999, the Government introduced a new average electricity tariff of 4.5c per 
kwt*hour23, which at that time was among the highest in the CIS (Table 10). The 
available estimates suggest that the volume of tariff subsidies amounted to 2% of GDP in 
1997 and 1.5% of GDP in 1998, but in 1999-2000 the remaining tariff subsidies (mostly 
in irrigation) did not exceed 0.5% of GDP a year (World Bank, 2001c).  Households 
received at least two-thirds of this amount, while commercial enterprises benefited from 
the rest. 
                                                 
22 For instance, in Kyrgyzstan the total quasi-fiscal deficit in the energy sector amounted to 9% of GDP in 
the mid 90-s, primarily due to low energy tariffs (World Bank, 2001b). 
23 Including VAT of 20%.  
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Figure 8. Fiscal and Quasi-fiscal Financing of Quasi-fiscal Subsidies in the 
Energy Sector 
 
 
 
Table. 10. Electricity Tariffs in Selected Economies in Transition in 2000, 
Without VAT, US cent per kwt 
 
 Residential Industry 
Armenia  3.6 3.0 
Azerbaijan  2.1 2.7 
Bulgaria 3.5 4.1 
Georgia  3.7 3.0 
Estonia  4.2 4.1 
Kazakhstan  2.2 2.1 
Kyrgyz Republic  0.004-1.9 1.3-1.6 
Latvia  5.3 4.4 
Lithuania  4.7-5.8 4.3 
Moldova  3.6-4.7 4.7 
Russia  1.5 1.3 
Ukraine  2.4 3.4 
Uzbekistan  0.4 0.4-0.6 
Source: World Bank 
Note: Residential tariffs include low voltage consumers other than households in Armenia, Georgia, Estonia, Latvia, 
and Moldova 
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Subsidization through non-payments, therefore, has been the main channel for 
quasi-fiscal subsidization.24 The culture of non-payment is well rooted in Armenia and it 
supports long chains of overdue payables within the economy. The overall annual flow of 
non-payments in the main utilities amounted to 8.7% of GDP in 1996 and 7.0% of GDP 
in 1998, but has been reduced considerably since 1999 (when it was 3.4% of GDP) due to 
a stronger Government reform effort (Table 11). Section V provides a detailed analysis of 
subsidization through non-payments.  
 
Table 11. Customers’ Non-payments to Main Utilities, Annual Flows, Percent of 
GDP 
 
  TOTAL Power Heat Gas Water Irrigation 
1996 8.68% 2.72% 0.24% 4.82% 0.56% 0.34% 
1997 5.75% 2.94% 0.18% 1.86% 0.67% 0.10% 
1998 6.99% 2.63% 0.47% 2.95% 0.87% 0.06% 
1999 3.43% 0.98% 0.71% 0.85% 0.79% 0.10% 
2000 3.78% 1.97% 0.24% 0.67% 0.74% 0.17% 
2001 2.02% 1.23% 0.18% -0.05% 0.52% 0.14% 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on Annex 2 
 
This excessive subsidization of the rest of economy, complemented by poor 
financial management in the sector, naturally resulted in major losses, accumulated by 
public companies in utilities and infrastructure. These losses, to the extent that they are 
financed by borrowing and other debts to the private sector, represent the single largest 
component of quasi-fiscal deficits in Armenia. This is quite typical for economies in 
transition.  What makes Armenia a little different is that: a) such deficits were somewhat 
smaller, and b) a relatively larger part of these deficits was admitted to be a direct 
liability of the state, and therefore was made rather explicit.  As was shown above, to 
reduce the outstanding debts in the sector, the Government has gradually expanded the 
provision of E&U companies with direct and hidden budget subsidies through various 
channels. 
 
IV.4. Contingent Liabilities 
 
Government Guarantees on commercial borrowing. A relatively large part of the 
total banking credit in Armenia was granted to the enterprise sector under explicit and 
implicit guarantees. Explicit guarantees have been limited (Table 11a), while implicit 
ones have been quite common. The energy companies have been the largest borrowers 
from the banking system. Their share has been approaching 40% of the total outstanding 
banking credit to the enterprise sector in 1998. This over-exposure to the energy sector 
derived from direct Government pressure on banks, complemented by the perception that 
the energy companies would always be bailed-out by the state. The share of banking 
credits to the energy sector gradually declined over 1998-2001 (Table 12) but still 
remained high, which represents a considerable risk for the banking sector as well as for 
the budget. 
                                                 
24 Gaddy and Ickes (1998) provide a detailed discussion of subsidization through non-payments in Russia. 
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Table 11a.  Government Guarantees Issued for Banking Credits Granted to 
Commercial Entities.  Annual flow, US$ million 
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
State guaranteed commercial credits 0.3 17.3 18.2 42.3 0 18.1 10.0 
Source: MOFE. 
 
Table 12. Outstanding Banking Credit to the E&U Sector in 1998-2001, year-end 
(mln Drams) 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Total credit to the economy 81,608 90,127 109,319 102,669 
Credit to the power sector 31,121 23,814 22,605 23,941 
   -- share in the total 38.1% 26.4% 20.7% 23.3% 
Credit to the water/irrigation sector 102 89 1,419 67 
   -- share in the total 0.1% 0.1% 1.3% 0.1% 
Source: NSS, CBA, Ministry of Energy, State Water Committee  
 
Under-financing of maintenance and rehabilitation. Under constant fiscal pressure 
from early in transition, the Government of Armenia has continuously underfinanced its 
basic infrastructure. Thus, de-capitalization of the main state energy and utility 
companies was another source of financing for quasi-fiscal subsidies provided by the 
E&U sector.  The total average annual amount of under-financing in the late 90s is 
conservatively estimated as 2.2% of GDP (Table 13). 
 
Table 13. The Annual Average Under-financing in the Energy and Infrastructure in 
the Late 90-s  
 
Total US$ 45 mln (or 2.2% of GDP) 
 - power 11 
 - irrigation 8 
 - municipal water 10 
 - roads 16 
Source: World Bank – expert estimates 
 
 
Section V. Financing of Hidden Deficit and the Ultimate Recipients of Quasi-Fiscal 
Subsidies 
 
 This section is aimed at estimating both the level and the structure of quasi-fiscal 
subsidies in the Armenian economy and analyzing the sources of their financing.  
  
Our estimates for various quasi-fiscal subsidy flows in the Armenian economy are 
based on the analysis of non-payments between the principal economic actors involved in 
consumption of energy and utility services. Our main assumption here is to consider the 
annual increase of payables of actor A to actor B as being equal to an annual subsidy 
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from B to A. This approach has been used in a number of other recent studies (Petri at al., 
2002; Pinto at al., 2000 a,b). 
 
 We reviewed the dynamics of payables and receivables for all main institutional 
actors for each year, 1997-2001, using the flows-of-funds framework. Table 14 provides 
quite a typical picture of annual inter-sectoral subsidization flows associated with non-
payments for delivered energy and utility services.  Many sectors were simultaneously 
recipients (as reflected in columns of Table 14) and providers (reflected in the rows) of 
quasi-fiscal subsidies. 
 
 The gas sector has been a major source of net quasi-fiscal subsidies in the 
economy during the entire period.  From the gas industry, subsidies have been diverted to 
power and heating companies, while the power sector channeled most of them further to 
irrigation, water, and industry.  Finally, all major sectors such as power, water, irrigation, 
and heating were involved in subsidization of households (Fig 9). In order to finance 
these QF subsidies and their own inefficiencies, all these sectors received explicit and 
implicit budget support as described above in Section IV. 
 
Therefore, the various sectors of the Armenian economy may be grouped as 
follows:  
• Main donors – providers of QF subsidies in the energy sector. 
• Intermediaries: sectors (drinking water and irrigation) that receive both budget 
and quasi-budget subsidies but transfer most of them to the final recipients.  
• Final recipients (households and the enterprise sector) of quasi-fiscal and 
budget subsidies. 
• Minor recipients of subsidies (transport, publishing). 
 
Table 15 provides the summary estimates for annual quasi-fiscal subsidies and 
their allocation among major recipients. This summary is based on the consolidation of 
six annual tables of subsidy flows similar to Table 14.25  It reveals that, due to a 
considerable reform effort, the incidence of total quasi-fiscal subsidies declined from an 
average of 3.8 % of GDP in 1996-98 to 2.7% of GDP in 1999 and 1.3% in 2001.26 This 
was one of the primary factors that contributed to a decline in the hidden deficit and  
                                                 
25 Annex 2 presents the full set of annual tables similar to Table 14.  
26 This should be viewed in a cross-country perspective. For instance, in Russia, heavy hidden and 
untargeted subsidies, provided through a system of tax and energy non-payments, amounted to 7-10% of 
GDP annually in 1995-97.  Adding explicit budgetary subsidies brought the total to in excess of 15% of 
GDP a year.  It is not surprising that such softness of budget constraints stifled enterprise restructuring and 
growth and made a major contribution to the 1998 crisis through accumulation of public debts (Pinto et al, 
2000a). 
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Table 14. Armenia. Inter-sectoral Flows of Subsidies, 1999, million Drams 
 
 
 
   Fiscal Budgeted and Hidden Subsidies Provided Subsidies Provided 
1999 Total net subsidies received Total Fiscal Budget subsidies Hidden subsidies 
Direct 
Budget 
Credits 
Increase 
in Tax 
Arrears 
Privatizati
on 
Proceeds 
Debt 
Transfer 
Total 
QF, net Power Heat Gas Water Irrigation 
Recipients:                             
Power 19,516 28,457 788 27,669 1,900 5,306 17,426 3,037 (8,941) (9,698)  758   
Heating (1,355) 3,142 3,252 (110)  (110)   (4,497)  (6,998) 2,501   
Gas sector (8,425) (13)  (13)  (13)   (8,412)   (8,412)   
Drinking water 58 7,020 3,805 3,215 1,200 547  1,468 (6,962) 869   (7,831)  
Irrigation  22,664 20,098 5,451 14,647 2,443 506  11,697 2,566 3,590    (1,024) 
Population 21,762 1,301  1,301  1,301   20,462 6,771 3,590 1,273 7,804 1,024 
Industry o/w 15,748 10,666  10,666 4,400 6,266   5,082 (1,524) 3,097 3,510   
Nairit    4,162 4,400 (238)   5,758 150 3,097 2,511   
Budgetary organiz 1,228 -  -     1,228 830  371 27  
Other  3,929 4,455 1,250 3,205 1,825 1,381   (527) (837) 310    
Banks 7,307        7,307 7,307.0     
Gross subsidies 84,847 75,124 14,546 60,578 11,768 15,182 17,426 16,202 29,339 9,698 6,998 8,412 7,831 1,024 
Gross sub./GDP 8.56% 7.58% 1.47% 6.11% 1.19% 1.53% 1.76% 1.63% 2.96% 0.98% 0.71% 0.85% 0.79% 0.10% 
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Figure 9. Main Subsidization Flows through Non-payments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 15.  Recipients and Donors of Quasi-fiscal Subsidies in Armenia, as 
Percent of GDP (on a net basis) 
 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Population 2.43% 2.05% 2.67% 2.06% 1.31% 1.05% 
Energy -3.28% -3.83% -4.02% -2.20% -1.95% -1.34% 
Water -0.42% -0.33% -0.47% -0.70% -0.30% -0.19% 
Irrigation 0.10% 0.31% 0.50% 0.26% 0.32% 0.19% 
Industry 0.62% 1.18% 0.86% 0.51% 0.29% 0.27% 
Others 0.55% 0.63% 0.46% 0.07% 0.33% 0.02% 
Total 3.70% 4.17% 4.50% 2.91% 2.25% 1.54% 
Source: Annex 2. 
 
overall improvements in fiscal performance.  Table 16 provides a summary of subsidy 
recipients for all subsidies (i.e. budgeted, hidden, and quasi-fiscal). 
 
Figure 10 illustrates the allocation of QF subsidies among the main recipients. 
Figure 11 compares the contributions of various parts of the E&U sector in financing gross 
QF subsidies. 
Energy system 
The rest of the world 
Nairit 
Irrigation Water 
Other 
Budget 
POPULATION 
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Figure 10. Quasi-fiscal Subsidies by Recipient, Percent 
 
 
Figure 11. Quasi-fiscal Subsidies by Source of Financing, Percent of GDP 
 
 
Table 16. Recipients of (Total) Subsidies in Armenia (mln AMD) 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Population 17,193 17,485 28,360 21,762 14,159 12,214 
Energy (9,829) 2,956 6,267 9,736 (2,012) 1,206 
Utilities (83) 2,470 11,008 22,721 15,834 10,662 
Industry 5,817 12,772 10,385 15,748 2,951 3,192 
Others 4,670 6,758 7,316 5,157 8,298 4,546 
Total Subsidies 
Received/Provided 27,680 42,440 63,336 75,124 41,242 31,821 
    as % of GDP 4.19 5.28 6.61 7.61 3.99 2.70 
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Quasi-fiscal Subsidies to the Ultimate Users – Population and Industry 
 
 As was shown before, the household sector is a major recipient of net quasi-fiscal 
subsidies, getting on average about 70% of the total (Figure 12).  In every year in 1996-99, 
the population received more than 2% of GDP in QF subsidies, while this amount declined 
to about 1% of GDP in 2001.  These amounts include household payables to the energy, 
water, heat, and gas sectors as well as some (small) increases in land tax arrears.  Overdue 
payables to the power and water sectors constitute around 70% of the total quasi-fiscal 
subsidies received by the population.  In addition, in 1997-98, households received tariff 
subsidies, which could be roughly estimated as 1% of GDP.  
 
Figure 12.  Quasi-fiscal Subsidies to Population as a Share of Total QF Subsidies, 
Percent 
 
 
QFS to Population as a share of total QFS 
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While this level of subsidization may provided some short term benefits to the 
population, its longer term implications are quite negative -- in the long rung, the 
population is affected by poor quality and shortages of energy and water supply and an 
overall decline in living standards.  Quasi-fiscal subsidies are also inefficient as an 
instrument of Government social policy: better-off households, which consume more E&U 
services, receive more benefits from subsidization.27 
  
Figure 13 compares the amount of quasi-fiscal subsidies received by the 
population, with the volume of public cash expenditures on social assistance and social 
insurance (pensions, poverty benefits and similar programs). Quasi-fiscal subsidies to the 
population amounted to 40-55% of social public expenditures in 1996-99, but declined to 
20-25% in 2000-2001.  This is still a very high share. A further reduction in QF subsidies 
with simultaneous increase in cash spending on social programs is fully justifiable in this 
situation. It is also worth mentioning that a significant increase of 1% of GDP in 
                                                 
27 See e.g. World Bank (1999a) for analysis of allocation of QF subsidies in irrigation. 
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Government social cash spending between 1997 and 2001 provided only a compensation 
for a simultaneous withdrawal of quasi-fiscal subsidies of the same magnitude. Overall, the 
population has not gain much.28 
 
Figure 13.  Quasi-Fiscal Subsidies to Population and Budget Expenditures on Social 
Protection/Insurance, 1996-01, percent of GDP 
 
 
The enterprise sector (outside of the E&U sector) has been the second largest 
recipient of QF subsidies.  Commercial enterprises received more than 1% of GDP in total 
QF subsidies in 1997, about 0.5% in 1999, and less than 0.3% in 2000-01 (Table 15). In all 
years except 1999 QF subsidies were the main source of subsidization for the enterprise 
sector (Fig 14). 
 
Figure 14.  Budgeted, Hidden, and Quasi-Fiscal Subsidies to the Enterprise Sector, 
percent of GDP 
0.0%
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28 However, significant efficiency gains have been achieved because Government social programs are better 
targeted to support the poor compared to QF subsidies.  
0
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Enterprise subsidies are heavily concentrated.  Nairit, a major chemical plant, was 
the only industrial enterprise that remained a recipient of direct budget subsidies in the late 
90-s.  Nairit was considered by the authorities to be too large to fail.  The total average 
annual subsidies (explicit and implicit) received by Nairit in 1997-2000 amounted to 0.6% 
of GDP (World Bank, 2001c).  In dollar equivalent, every one of the 4000 employees was 
a recipient of an annual subsidy that amounted to about $2,500.  This should be compared 
to an average industrial wage of about $600 a year in that period, and the average salary of 
a teacher of $350 a year. The Government completed privatization of Nairit in the first part 
of 2002. 
 
The Government should accelerate liquidation and/or forced restructuring of such 
large non-viable firms, which would have a beneficial impact on the entire enterprise 
sector.  However, there is no evidence so far that softness of budget constraints for a few of 
the largest companies was among the major factors that slowed down the overall enterprise 
restructuring process.  Hidden and quasi-fiscal subsidies in Armenia have been much more 
a fiscal and social policy issue than a restructuring problem. 
 
How E&U Companies Have Financed QF Subsidies – The Case of the Power Sector 
 
The main source of funding of quasi-fiscal subsidies was the operational cash flow 
of (mostly publicly-owned) energy companies – primarily in the gas and power sectors.  In 
turn, gas and power companies financed their operational deficit from three sources: a) by 
building debts to their suppliers and commercial banks, b) through under-maintenance of 
company assets, and c) getting a considerable amount of explicit and implicit budget 
assistance. 
 
Table 17 presents an illustration of how quasi-fiscal subsidies have been financed 
by the energy sector. It shows that the ultimate source of financing of QF subsidies, 
provided by the consolidated energy sector (i.e. gas, power and heating sub-sectors), was 
the Government, budget.  Since 1997, each year except 2000, the total subsidies received 
by the energy sector have been higher than provided by it to the rest of the economy. As 
one could expect, the Government was not able to shift a responsibility for public support 
to population and ailing industries outside of the budget. Additional public resources were 
consumed by the power sector to cover its inefficiencies and internal losses, including 
stealing.  
Table 17.  Financing of Subsidies Provided by the Energy Sector, Percent of GDP 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
QF Subsidies provided 3.28% 3.83% 4.02% 2.20% 1.95% 1.34% 
Subsidies received, o/w 1.79% 4.20% 4.68% 3.19% 1.75% 1.45% 
Budgeted 0.00% 0.11% 0.02% 0.41% 0.01% 0.01% 
Hidden 1.79% 4.09% 4.65% 2.78% 1.74% 1.43% 
Net:  (+)Provided/(-)Received 1.49% -0.37% -0.66% -0.98% 0.19% -0.10% 
Memo:  Underfinancing 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 
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Main Policy Conclusions 
 
• The reduction in quasi-fiscal deficits has been a major source of fiscal adjustment 
in Armenia in the second part of the 90-s; this reduction as well as decline in the 
hidden deficit may be seen as an indication that the recent fiscal stabilization was 
quite genuine, i.e. an improvement in budget performance has not been 
accompanied by accumulation of any significant Government off-budget liabilities.  
 
• These declines in quasi-fiscal deficits also explain significant improvements in 
macroeconomic stability in Armenia (since 1997) and positive changes in its debt 
profile (since 2000). 
 
• Improved performance in the energy sector (primarily in power and gas) was 
directly associated with the decline in incidence of quasi-fiscal subsidies. 
 
• Still, the current level of public sector deficit remains too high, which requires an 
additional adjustment effort; a recent research suggests (World Bank, 2002) that 
further adjustment should prioritize an improvement in tax performance, not 
additional expenditure compression.  
 
• The paper also indicates a need to strengthen financial control, accounting and 
reporting in the public sector, including through better Government monitoring of 
debts and other liabilities accumulated by the large state enterprises and phasing 
out the phenomenon of implicit (hidden subsidies), such as e.g. debt-for-equity 
swaps. 
 
• Population has been the major recipient of quasi-fiscal subsidies in Armenia; this 
means that in addition to its negative impact on fiscal performance, quasi-fiscal 
subsidization has been distorting Government’s social policies; at the same time, 
these subsidies had less impact on enterprise restructuring.  
 
• Recent significant compression in quasi-fiscal subsidies to population provides an 
additional argument in favor of expansion in Government social spending, 
especially on poverty benefits and old age pensions. 
 
• The proposed approach to the analysis of quasi-fiscal deficits and subsidies seems 
to be fully applicable to other economies in transition, especially to those low-
income CIS countries, which are heavily dependent on energy imports. 
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Annex 1. External borrowing by the Government to support operations of the energy 
and utility sector 
 
    1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
1 Irrigation credit  - 6,022.7 11,697.3 4,728.0 4,392.3 
   IDA irrigation rehab. Credit 29.4 mln SDR  3,519.8 7,855.4 2,823.9 730.0 
  IDA ASIF (30%)  593.5 337.3 229.9 326.2 
  IFAD irrigation credit 5.4 mln SDR    110.9 9.8 
  IFAD credit for development of North-West regions of Armenia  1,909.3 3,504.6 873.5  
  IDA Dam safety 19.7 mln SDR    689.9 3,326.2 
         
2 Water sector credits - 1,225.2 1,468.1 2,342.7 2,413.8 
  IDA municipal water project  631.7 1,034.8 1,882.5 1,809.9 
  IDA ASIF (30%)  593.5 433.3 460.2 603.9 
         
3 Energy credits  2,370.1 8,392.3 3,036.7 1,857.1 4,350.4 
  IDA_1 1,962.8 2,272.1 2,782.5   
  IDA_2  1,196.3 175.4 441.4 143.0 
  German Gov. credit 25 mln DM_3   78.8 1,368.1 2,616.8 
  German Gov. credit 27.5 mln DM_4    47.6 980.8 
  Russian credit 249 bln RR_5 407.3     
  Russian credit 20.57 mln USD_6  4,875.1    
  Japan Gov. credit 5.399 bn yen_7  48.8   609.7 
 Energy credit      
1 Energy sector maintenance credit  9.4 mln SDR      
2 Energy Transmission and distribution credit 15 mln SDR        
3 for repair of Kanaker HES      
4 for installation of electricity transmission systems      
5 for Nuclear fuel      
6 for Nuclear Fuel      
7 for rehabilitation the electricity transmission and distribution systems      
Annex 2.  Main Annual Subsidy Flows in the Economy, 1996-2001, mln Dram 
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Total net 
subsidies 
received
Total 
Fiscal
Budget 
subsidies
Hidden 
subsidies
Direct 
Budget 
Credits
Increase in 
Tax 
Arrears
Privatizati
on 
Proceeds
Debt 
Transfer
Total QF, 
net Power Heat Gas Water Irrigation
Recipients:
Power 20,037    9,100     9,100     1,100     8,000     10,937     (17,987)   28,924      
Heating 2,001      2,739     2,739     2,739     (738)         (1,585)     846           
Gas sector (31,867)   -        -        (31,867)    (31,867)    
Drinking water (713)        2,060     2,060     2,000     60          (2,773)      908          (3,681)     
Irrigation 630         -        -        630          2,875       (2,245)     
Population 17,193    1,129     1,129     1,129     16,064     8,408       1,481      326           3,604      2,245      
Industry o/w 5,817      1,726     1,726     1,726     4,092       2,321       1,771        
Nairit 2,743      2,143     2,143     2,143     600          600           
Budgetary organiz 565         -        -        565          565          
Other 4,105      1,015     418        597        597        3,090       2,910       103         77           
Banks
Gross subsidies 50,348    17,768   418        17,350   8,162     9,189     -        -        35,378     17,987     1,585      31,867      3,681      2,245      
Gross sub./GDP 7.61% 2.69% 0.06% 2.62% 1.23% 1.39% 0.00% 0.00% 5.35% 2.72% 0.24% 4.82% 0.56% 0.34%
Total net 
subsidies 
received
Total 
Fiscal
Budget 
subsidies
Hidden 
subsidies
Direct 
Budget 
Credits
Increase in 
Tax 
Arrears
Privatizati
on 
Proceeds
Debt 
Transfer
Total QF, 
net Power Heat Gas Water Irrigation
Recipients:
Power 16,555    33,170   800        32,370   30,000   2,370     (16,615)    (23,649)   7,034        
Heating 929         171        104        67          67          758          (1,480)     2,238        
Gas sector (14,528)   448        448        448        (14,976)    (14,976)    
Drinking water (232)        2,443     291        2,152     2,000     152        (2,675)      2,684       (5,359)     
Irrigation 2,702      223        200        23          23          2,479       3,275       (796)        
Population 17,485    1,014     1,014     1,014     16,471     9,847       1,346      25             4,457      796         
Industry o/w 12,772    3,274     3,274     3,274     9,497       3,818       5,679        
Nairit 4,574      534        534        534        4,040       335          3,705        
Budgetary organiz 229         -        -        229          229          
Other 6,529      1,698     1,591     106        106        4,831       3,795       134         902         
Banks
Gross subsidies 40,645    42,440   2,986     39,454   2,000     35,084   -        2,370     34,266     23,649     1,480      14,976      5,359      796         
Gross sub./GDP 5.05% 5.28% 0.37% 4.91% 0.25% 4.36% 0.00% 0.29% 4.26% 2.94% 0.18% 1.86% 0.67% 0.10%
Total net 
subsidies 
received
Total 
Fiscal
Budget 
subsidies
Hidden 
subsidies
Direct 
Budget 
Credits
Increase in 
Tax 
Arrears
Privatizati
on 
Proceeds
Debt 
Transfer
Total QF, 
net Power Heat Gas Water Irrigation
Recipients:
Power 31,523    39,820   39,820   10,222   21,206   8,392     (8,297)      (25,158)   16,861      
Heating (1,120)     787        230 557        557        (1,907)      (4,527)     2,620        
Gas sector (24,136)   4,099     4,099     4,099     (28,235)    (28,235)    
Drinking water (1,204)     3,323     3,323     2,000     97          1,225     (4,527)      3,769       (8,296)     
Irrigation 12,212    7,410     7,410     1,795     (407)      6,023     4,801       5,370       (569)        
Population 28,360    2,813     2,813     647        2,166     25,547     12,205     4,147      1,245        7,381      569         
Industry o/w 10,385    2,134     2,134     2,134     8,251       862          7,389        
Nairit 313        313        6,558       6,558        
Budgetary organiz 1,465      -        -        1,465       1,345       120           
Other 5,851      2,950     1,399     1,551     508        1,043     2,901       1,606       380         915         
Banks
Gross subsidies 89,796    63,336   1,629     61,707   4,950     19,911   21,206   15,640   42,966     25,158     4,527      28,235      8,296      569         
Gross sub./GDP 9.39% 6.63% 0.17% 6.46% 0.52% 2.08% 2.22% 1.64% 4.50% 2.63% 0.47% 2.95% 0.87% 0.06%
1996
Fiscal Budgeted and Hidden Subsidies Provided
1998
Fiscal Budgeted and Hidden Subsidies Provided Subsidies Provided
1997
Fiscal Budgeted and Hidden Subsidies Provided Subsidies Provided
Subsidies Provided
Annex 2.  Main Annual Subsidy Flows in the Economy, 1996-2001, mln Dram 
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Total net 
subsidies 
received
Total 
Fiscal
Budget 
subsidies
Hidden 
subsidies
Direct 
Budget 
Credits
Increase in 
Tax 
Arrears
Privatizati
on 
Proceeds
Debt 
Transfer
Total QF, 
net Power Heat Gas Water Irrigation
Recipients:
Power 19,516    28,457   788        27,669   1,900     5,306     17,426   3,037     (8,941)      (9,698)     758           
Heating (1,355)     3,142     3,252     (110)      (110)      (4,497)      (6,998)     2,501        
Gas sector (8,425)     (13)        (13)        (13)        (8,412)      (8,412)      
Drinking water 58           7,020     3,805     3,215     1,200     547        1,468     (6,962)      869          (7,831)     
Irrigation 22,664    20,098   5,451     14,647   2,443     506        11,697   2,566       3,590       (1,024)     
Population 21,762    1,301     1,301     1,301     20,462     6,771       3,590      1,273        7,804      1,024      
Industry o/w 15,748    10,666   10,666   4,400     6,266     5,082       (1,524)     3,097      3,510        
Nairit 4,162     4,400     (238)      5,758       150          3,097      2,511        
Budgetary organiz 1,228      -        -        1,228       830          371           27           
Other 3,929      4,455     1,250     3,205     1,825     1,381     (527)         (837)        310         
Banks 7,307      7,307       7,307.0
Gross subsidies 84,847    75,124   14,546   60,578   11,768   15,182   17,426   16,202   29,339     9,698       6,998      8,412        7,831      1,024      
Gross sub./GDP 8.56% 7.58% 1.47% 6.11% 1.19% 1.53% 1.76% 1.63% 2.96% 0.98% 0.71% 0.85% 0.79% 0.10%
Total net 
subsidies 
received
Total 
Fiscal
Budget 
subsidies
Hidden 
subsidies
Direct 
Budget 
Credits
Increase in 
Tax 
Arrears
Privatizati
on 
Proceeds
Debt 
Transfer
Total QF, 
net Power Heat Gas Water Irrigation
Recipients:
Power 7,852      16,567   16,567   422        14,288   1,857     (8,715)      (20,295)   11,580      
Heating (4,479)     43          106.5 (64)        (64)        (4,522)      (28)          (2,449)     (2,045)      
Gas sector (5,386)     1,509     1,509     1,509     (6,894)      (6,894)      
Drinking water 2,566      5,691     1,277     4,414     2,071     2,343     (3,125)      4,516       (7,641)     
Irrigation 13,268    9,935     4,760     5,175     447        4,728     3,334       5,111       (1,777)     
Population 14,159    582        582        422        160        13,577     5,801       (114)        (512)         6,626      1,777      
Industry o/w 2,951      -        -        2,951       1,553       2,134      (1,682)      946         
Nairit -        197          2,118      (1,921)      
Budgetary organiz 1,235      -        -        1,235       1,312       25           (171)         69           
Other 7,063      4,904     1,261     3,643     3,531     112        2,159       2,031       404         (276)         
Banks 1,075      1,075       1,074.7
Gross subsidies 49,094    39,229   7,404     31,825   3,953     4,656     14,288   8,928     23,256     20,295     2,449      6,894        7,641      1,777      
Gross sub./GDP 4.75% 3.80% 0.72% 3.08% 0.38% 0.45% 1.38% 0.86% 2.25% 1.97% 0.24% 0.67% 0.74% 0.17%
Total net 
subsidies 
received
Total 
Fiscal
Budget 
subsidies
Hidden 
subsidies
Direct 
Budget 
Credits
Increase in 
Tax 
Arrears
Privatizati
on 
Proceeds
Debt 
Transfer
Total QF, 
net Power Heat Gas Water Irrigation
Recipients:
Power 7,914      22,544   22,544   3,200     2,413     12,581   4,350     (14,630)    (14,524)   (106)         
Heating (2,165)     (390)      160.5 (551)      (551)      (1,775)      297          (2,067)     (5)             
Gas sector (4,543)     (5,130)   (5,130)   (5,130)   587          587           
Drinking water (933)        1,331     837        494        (1,920)   2,414     (2,264)      3,876       (6,140)     
Irrigation 11,595    9,338     4,200     5,138     746        4,392     2,257       3,847       (1,590)     
Population 12,214    (170)      (170)      71          (242)      12,385     4,371       42           339           6,044      1,590      
Industry o/w 3,192      -        -        3,192       2,249       1,816      (842)         (31)          
Nairit 3,093      -        -        3,093       2,469       1,281      (657)         -          
Budgetary organiz 743         -        -        743          579          8             29             128         
Other 3,803      4,298     1,552     2,746     1,845     901        (494)         (694)        201         (1)             
Banks (1,333)     (1,333)      -1,333.0
Gross subsidies 34,919    31,821   6,749     25,071   5,116     (3,782)   12,581   11,156   19,164     14,524     2,067      (587)         6,140      1,590      
Gross sub./GDP 2.97% 2.70% 0.57% 2.13% 0.43% -0.32% 1.07% 0.95% 1.63% 1.23% 0.18% -0.05% 0.52% 0.14%
2001
Fiscal Budgeted and Hidden Subsidies Provided Subsidies Provided
1999
Fiscal Budgeted and Hidden Subsidies Provided Subsidies Provided
2000
Fiscal Budgeted and Hidden Subsidies Provided Subsidies Provided
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